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Introduction
In September, 2005, then-Senator Barack Obama articulated his views on
qualities he deemed essential for a Justice serving on the Supreme Court.

While

acknowledging that “95 percent” of cases that come before most any court would be
decided similarly by “a Scalia” or “a Ginsburg” based on settled precedent and rules of
constitutional construction, President Obama asserted that what matters most “is those 5
percent of cases that are truly difficult.”2

In such cases, he continued, established

precedent “will only get you through the 25th mile of the marathon…[t]hat last mile can
only be determined on the basis of one’s deepest values, one’s core concerns, one’s
broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth and breadth of one’s
empathy.”3 The “critical ingredient” in deciding such cases is “supplied by what is in the
judge’s heart.”4 President Obama refined and reasserted his position in favor of an
empathetic Justice upon the appointment of Sonia Sotomayor in 2009, saying that he
would “seek someone who understands that justice isn't about some abstract legal theory
or footnote in a casebook"5 and that he views empathy as “an essential ingredient for
arriving at just decisions and outcomes.”6
Perhaps unsurprisingly the idea that “empathy” should be either a characteristic of
nominees to the Court or a tool used by members of the Court has sparked its fair share of

2

151 Cong. Rec. 21,032 (2005)(floor Statement of Senator Barack Obama on Nomination of John
Roberts to be Chief Justice)[hereinafter Floor Statement].
3

Id.

4

Id.

5

President Barack Obama, Remarks on the Retirement of Justice David Souter (May 1, 2009),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900317.pdf cited in Major Garrett,
Obama Pushes for Empathetic Supreme Court Justices, Fox News, May 1, 2009 available at
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/05/01/obama-pushes-empathetic-supreme-court-justices/.
6

Id.

3

controversy from across the political spectrum.7 Although a lynchpin of then-Senator
Obama’s thinking and rhetoric during the confirmation process of John Roberts and also
through Obama’s own nomination of Sonia Sotomayor, empathy was scarcely mentioned
by the President when nominating Elena Kagan.8 During the Sotomayor hearings thennominee Sotomayor herself in fact evaded in-depth discussion of the specific subject of
empathy.9 By the time of Kagan’s nomination to the Court the Obama administration had
stopped mentioning empathy in public statements regarding nominees altogether.10 But
why?

Overwhelmingly, the answer has been taken to be a result of the political

complications around elaborating on the notion of empathy. Legal philosophical and
jurisprudential arguments are either too esoteric for meaningful public consumption or
can easily become political “hot button” issues. As such, during the confirmation of
Justice Sotomayor Democratic Senators “charged with shepherding Sotomayor through
the mountain pass of the Senate confirmation process,”11 were extremely careful of letting
Sotomayor’s nomination “slip into some philosophical crevasse.”12

7

See , e.g., id; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Need for Empathy on the Court, National Law Journal,
Oct. 31, 2011; Editorial,The Supreme Court: Empathy v. Law – Which Sonia Sotomayor is the Senate
About to Confirm?, The Economist, Jul. 16, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/node/14031304;
Jonah Goldberg, Empathy and the Supreme Court, L.A. Times, Apr. 13, 2010, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/13/opinion/la-oe-goldberg13-2010apr13; John Paul Rollert, Obama’s
Empathy for the Supreme Court, Mar. 22, 2011, Huffington Post available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-paul-rollert/obamas-empathy-for-the-su_b_838638.html; Janet Hook
& Christi Parsons, Obama Calls Empathy Key to Supreme Court Pick, May 2, 2009, L.A. Times available
at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/02/nation/na-court-souter2.
8

See John Paul Rollert, Reversed on Appeal: The Uncertain Future of President Obama’s Empathy
Standard, 120 Yale L.J. 89, 90 (2010). This article, cited frequently herein, stands out as a leading piece of
scholarship on President Obama’s empathy standard.
9

Id.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.
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Interestingly, despite the political sensitivities surrounding the use of the term
“empathy,” empathy has often been cited as a desirable quality for those serving in other
public functions.

Perhaps most obvious is the “empathizer-in-chief” title laudably

bestowed upon Bill Clinton by members of the press.13 Moreover, that empathy is an
admirable characteristic of members of a democratic society generally is hardly subject to
dispute.14 Further, the idea that empathy or similar characteristics and traits are desirable
ones for members of the Supreme Court is not entirely new. In the empathy “vein”
Woodrow Wilson famously remarked that only those who understand “that law is
subservient to life and not life to law”15 are suitable nominees to the Court. Benjamin
Cardozo in a series of influential writings on judicial decision-making has been
understood as articulating that “judges should be true to their sense of justice, shaped as it
is by their own life experiences”16 when the letter of the law is less than clear in its
application to the particular facts at hand. Justice William Rehnquist himself in a rarely
cited article published early in his legal career inadvertently highlighted the gap to be
filled by empathy when he wrote:
It is high time that those critical of the present Court
recognize … [that] the constitution has been what the
judges say it is…[i]f greater judicial self-restraint is
desired, or a different interpretation of the phrases “due

13

See Howard Fineman, The Next Florida, Newsweek, Oct. 31, 2004, available at
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2004/10/31/the-next-florida.html.
14

See John Paul Rollert, supra note 7 at 106 (“…no one can deny that [empathy] is a powerful virtue
in a large and diverse democracy.”).
15

Woodrow Wilson, “An After-Dinner Talk” (Dec. 9, 1916), in 40 The Papers of Woodrow Wilson
193, 196 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1982) as cited in Catherine Crowe, Videri Quam Esse: The Role of Empathy
in Judicial Discourse, 34 Law & Psychol. Rev. 121 (2010).
16

See Kim McClane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons from Judge Cardozo, 85
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1629, 1633 (2010).
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process of law” or “equal protection of the laws,” then men
sympathetic to such desires must sit upon the high court.17
Although not speaking directly to the value of empathy in his article Justice Rehnquist
appears at least to recognize the place of characteristics such as empathy on the Court.
Even if Justice Rehnquist is not personally a proponent of empathy as a consideration in
the nomination and confirmation process his remarks reveal, perhaps more articulately
and significantly than others, the critical role that empathy could play in the decisionmaking process at the Supreme Court level.
The possibilities for empathy as a judicial tool, as opposed to a personal
characteristic of nominees to the Court, are likewise not new or novel concepts. Empathy
has previously been advanced outside of the context of the Court’s confirmation process
as an explicit tool for judges looking at cases involving a wide range of legal issues as
diverse as Section 1983,18 immigration,19 discrimination and Title VII,20 pleading
standards,21 economic equality and predatory lending,22 and gender issues23 among others.
The most recent scholarship on empathy as a characteristic of Justices and in the
confirmation process however has addressed empathy’s historical significance and

17

William H. Rehnquist, The Making of a Supreme Court Justice, Harv. L. Rec. (Oct. 8, 1959) 10.

18

See Sheldon Nahmod, The Restructuring of Narrative and Empathy in 1983 Cases, 72 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 819 (1997).
See Lauren Gilbert, The 26th Mile: Empathy and the Immigration Decisions of Justice Sotomayor,
31 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1 (2010).

19

20

See Michael J. Zimmer, Systemic Empathy, 34 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 575 (2003).

21

See Darrell A.H. Miller, Iqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L. Rev. 999 (2010).

22

See Mitchell F. Crusto, Obama’s Moral Capitalism: Resuscitating the American Dream, 63 U.
Miami L. Rev. 1011 (2009).
23

See Hon. Diane S. Sykes, Speech: Gender and Judging, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 1381 (2011).
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roots,24 the political nature of empathy and theoretical political strategies for overcoming
weaknesses in the empathy argument,25 and the tenuous political future of empathy as a
quality overtly sought in nominees to the Court.26 The thrust of this recent scholarship
focuses on empathy’s benefits.27

The various authors examining empathy as a

characteristic of Supreme Court nominees include scholars, federal and state judges, and
practitioners alike with the majority view tending to hold that despite the political
thorniness of invoking empathy the Obama administration should continue to consider
the empathetic capabilities of potential nominees in selecting future Justices.
With these considerations in mind this paper will seek to germinate answers to the
overarching question: what is the current meaning and purpose of empathy as a quality
for Supreme Court Justices and how can, and should, this purpose be effectively
promoted moving forward? Working within the recent line of scholarship on empathy
just mentioned this paper supports the position that empathy is both a desirable and
necessary quality for nominees to the Court but also suggests that it should not be the
only defining quality considered by the president. The paper will argue first that the
Obama administration’s conception of empathy is clear, reasonable, and workable and
review the political considerations that seem to have stymied overtly embracing empathy
as a consideration. Further, this paper will show that the role empathy might play for a
particular justice once on the Court is uncertain, suggesting that perhaps empathy should

24

See Wardlaw, supra note 12 (discussing the role of empathy for Judge Cardozo and the way in
which he discredited the notion that the legal system was a group of “preordained” rules “logically to be
discovered and mechanically to be applied”).
25

See Tobin A. Sparling, Resurrecting the Argument for Judicial Empathy: Can a Dead Duck Be
Successfully Repackaged for Sale to a Skeptical Public? 20 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (2010)
26

See Rollert, supra note 7.

27

See supra notes 23-25.
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not be the leading consideration advanced by the president in choosing a nominee. This
paper will reveal the arguments for why empathy is a very meaningful and admirable
quality and should remain a consideration, however, the paper will also show that for
policy and practical political reasons empathy should probably not occupy the central
public role initially suggested by President Obama in the nomination of Sonia
Sotomayor, or be the only factor considered in choosing future nominees.
In order to structure the argument this paper culls the confirmation records and
testimonies of four current Justices purportedly nominated and confirmed to the Court
because of the unique perspective they would bring as Justices:28 Clarence Thomas,
appointed by George H. W. Bush; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, appointed by Bill Clinton; and
Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, both nominees of Barack Obama and by default
arguably symbolic of his empathy standard. By examining the confirmation testimony
and select subsequent decisions of these Justices the paper will examine the role
considerations of empathy actually played throughout the nomination and confirmation
processes, and more critically, the potential for empathy as a characteristic of future
nominees by briefly discussing some work of these Justices in the remaining pages.29
Part I will examine what has become the “Obama standard” and the understanding
of empathy advanced by President Obama arguing that the concept of empathy as a
consideration is clear and reasonable as well as important and meaningful. Part II will
consider the four nominations and confirmations of the previously mentioned Justices
with a focus on notions of empathy throughout their nomination and confirmation
28

See infra notes 48-51.

29

Due to space constraints neither the historical accounts of the confirmation hearings nor the
concluding analysis are meant to be completely exhaustive. Either could be expanded in further work or
expanded accounts.

8

processes and the political implications of empathy as a consideration. Part III will
briefly discuss the work of the four selected Justices while on the Court to consider the
extent to which empathy can if at all be discerned from their work on the Court as well as
draw some other summary conclusions from merging the work in Parts I and II. The
result is that empathy’s impact in constitutional jurisprudence is hardly predictable or
reliable, and that though beneficial and meaningful, empathy should probably not be
relied upon as the primary factor in selecting a Justice but should be considered alongside
other factors.
I.

The Obama Standard of Empathy

President Obama’s understanding of empathy as a qualification for members of
the Supreme Court is clear, reasonable, and workable. The president’s views, however,
have not been unanimously embraced by lawmakers and jurists and represent one side of
a significant legal and jurisprudential rift. The depth and ideological complexity of this
two-sided debate makes touting empathy as a primary quality sought in nominees to the
Court politically difficult and potentially dangerous to the nominee.30
a.

Obama’s Empathy: Reasonable and Workable
What precisely President Obama means when he has expressed a desire to appoint

Justices with “empathy” is not exactly certain but can be gleaned from his his 2006 book
The Audacity of Hope.31 Distinguishing empathy from “sympathy or charity,”32 Obama
refers to empathy as a “call to stand in somebody else’s shoes, and see through their
eyes.” A leading scholar on Obama’s call for empathy on the Court, John Paul Rollert,
30

See generally Rollert, supra note 7.

31

See also , id. at 100 (“Obama’s only sustained discussion of empathy comes not in his speeches or
in remarks he made during his presidential campaign, but in…The Audacity of Hope.”).
32

Barack Obama, The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream 66 (2006).

9

calls Obama’s distinction between “sympathy and charity” on the one hand and empathy
on the other “critically important.”33 Despite possibly leading to feelings of sympathy in
cases where there is serious suffering, the exercise of empathy, Rollert writes, is
distinguishable from sympathy in that empathy “is characterized not by the pity we feel
for others but by our attempt to understand their reality.”34 Empathy in the Obama view
is not feeling sorrow on behalf of a litigant, but seeking to understand the “setbacks and
triumphs”35 and the “blessings as well as [the] burdens”36 of the litigant. It is this clear
distinction between sympathy and empathy that helps make empathy both a virtuous
aspiration for nominees to the Supreme Court as well as a reasonable and fairly workable
policy consideration. This is especially so given the legal ambiguity in those extremely
unique cases that make it before the Court.
In speeches on the notion of appointing a Justice with empathy Barack Obama has
been fairly explicit and illustrative in articulating his understanding of the term and the
distinct meaning of empathy. In a 2007 speech at a conference for Planned Parenthood
then-Senator Obama remarked that “we need somebody who’s got the…empathy, to
recognize what it’s like to be a young teenage mom…[t]he empathy to understand what
it’s like to be poor, or African-American, or gay, or disabled, or old.”37 Again these
remarks show that the Obama concept of empathy is distinct from the notion of pure
sympathy. President Obama does not advance empathy as a means for jurists to fall prey
33

Rollert, supra note 7 at 100.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Senator Barack Obama, Address Before the Planned Parenthood Action Fund, (July 17, 2007)
available at http://sites.google.com/site/lauraetch/barackobamabeforeplannedparenthoodaction cited by
Crowe, supra note 14.
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to whimsical emotions, but as means for them to understand the broader context and
experience of each of the litigants before them in an effort to “arriv[e] at just decisions
and outcomes”38 when “the law strays into uncertainty.”39
b.

Umpire v. Empathizer
The Obama concept of empathy can be understood in the context of what have

emerged as the principle divergent views on the role and duty of Supreme Court
Justices:40 the Justice with “empathy”41 as articulated by President Barack Obama and the
Justice as “umpire”42 as espoused by Chief Justice John Roberts.

These views are

characterized by the argument either that a Justice be like an “umpire” in that they do not
make the rules but simply apply them,43 or instead, have “empathy” in their role on the
bench when filling the obvious gaps in the law exposed by cases and controversies that
are “those 5 percent of cases that are truly difficult.”44 A Justice with empathy is not a
perfect opposite of a Justice merely applying the rules like an “umpire,” but the two
notions nonetheless represent political and theoretical loggerheads in the current debate
on the role of empathy as advanced by President Obama.45

38

President Barack Obama, Remarks on the Retirement of Justice David Souter, supra note 4.

39

Rollert, supra note7 at 102.

40

See Sparling, supra note 24 at 3-7.

41

See Floor Statement, supra note 1.

42

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United
States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005)(Statement of John G.
Roberts)[hereinafter Roberts Hearing].
43

Id. See also Aaron S. J. Zelinsky, Benching the Judge-Umpire Analogy, 119 Yale L.J. Online 113
(2010) available at http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/supreme-court/the-justice-ascommissioner:-benching-the-judge%11umpire-analogy/.
44

Floor Statement, supra note 1.

45

See generally Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, The Constitution as the Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1035 (2009). It is also worth noting that Chief Justice Roberts’ view that “Judges
and Justices are servants of the law” seems to conflict directly with President Wilson’s view on Supreme

11

The dangers for the nominee of an in-depth public debate over empathy in a
confirmation hearing—or on virtually any other topic for that matter—are too obvious to
warrant much extended discussion in this paper.

The leading example of the

ramifications of a nominee’s willingness to engage in controversial detailed scholarly
discourse in the public eye during a confirmation hearing is undoubtedly Robert Bork.46
Since the Bork hearings it has been said that “[t]he incentive in these [senate
confirmation] hearings is for the senators to say as much, and the nominees to say as
little, as possible.”47 The negative implications of a nominee discussing empathy in too
great of detail during a confirmation hearing are too great to warrant such extended
discussion. As has been noted, “the real debate underlying the empathy controversy is
not whether judges can simply make up the rules (or the laws) as they go along…The
debate is over the relative clarity of the law…and where a judge should look whenever
the law is unclear.”48 This debate appears to be too risky for nominees to embark upon in
the confirmation hearing setting. These implications and the meaning of discussions
surrounding empathy in select confirmation hearings and nominations is the subject to
which the next section turns.

II.

Empathy and The Confirmation Process

Court Justices and the law. Compare Statement of John G. Roberts, supra note 30 with Woodrow Wilson,
“An After-Dinner Talk,” supra note 14. It is also worth noting that Chief Justice Roberts’ view has been
challenged head-on by another leading jurist, Richard Posner, who leveled the claim that no person
honestly believes the rules in our judicial system are given to judges “…the way the rules of baseball are
given to umpires.” Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 78 (2008).
46

See Kenji Yoshino, On Empathy in Judgment (Measure for Measure), 57 Clev. St. L. Rev. 683,
683 (2009).
47

Id.

48

John Paul Rollert, The Suprising Star at Elena Kagan’s Hearing: Thurgood Marshall, The
Christian Science Monitor (Jul. 8, 2010).
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By examining the nomination and confirmation processes of four current Justices
we can glean both the significance of empathy as a quality for members of the Court as
well as the political sensitivity of the term given the umpire versus empathizer
ideological debate just discussed.

This section considers the nomination and

confirmation of four Justices arguably nominated for what were understood to be the
unique perspectives they would bring to the Court vis-a-vis their personal backgrounds:
Clarence Thomas;49 Ruth Bader Ginsburg;50 Sonia Sotomayor;51 and, Elena Kagan.52
Though empathy is a quality that one can attempt to espouse and exercise regardless of
background or upbringing, notions of empathy in the current discourse seem indelibly
tied to the background experiences of nominees.53
a.

Clarence Thomas
The clear disconnect between what Clarence Thomas was expected to bring to the

Court once confirmed based on his confirmation testimony and what he seems instead to

49

See Eric L. Muller, Where, But For the Grace of God Goes He? The Search for Empathy in The
Criminal Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 15 Const. Commentary 225 (1998)(describing the nomination
and confirmation of Clarence Thomas as consisting of a “strategy of emphasizing [Thomas’] impoverished,
racism-tinged upbringing in the tiny town of Pin-Point, Georgia, rather than his professional
accomplishments and commitments”).
50

See Byron York, Advice and Consent? How Clinton Chose Ginsburg, National Review Online
(Jul. 5, 2005)(quoting Clinton White House senior staffer George Stephanopoulos from his book All too
Human as saying Ginsburg “would be the first Jewish Justice since Abe Fortas, and the first woman to be
appointed by a Democrat. More important, she was a pioneer in the legal fight for women’s rights–a
female Thurgood Marshall”) available at http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/214854/advice-andconsent-how-clinton-chose-ginsburg/byron-york.
51

See, e.g., Remarks on the Retirement of Justice David Souter, supra note 4 (describing the Obama
administration’s viewpoint on empathy as a criteria for nominees). As Sotomayor and Kagan were both
nominated by President Obama it can be inferred that their life experiences and the effect these would have
on their empathy were considerations of the president.
52

Id.

53

See supra notes 48-51. See also Riddhi Dasgupta, Rising Above Themselves: Why Today’s
Lawyers of Color Must Look Beyond Color, 16 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 495 (2010); Gilbert, supra note 18.
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have brought to the Court has been extensively noted.54 Interestingly, much of the
discussion in this respect pertains to empathy,55 or as Thomas himself puts it in his
confirmation hearing the ability to “walk in the shoes”56 of those before the Court.
Thomas described his ability to level with litigants as “something different”57 he would
bring to the Court, using empathy to bear in mind “the people who are affected by what
the Court does.”58 In a manner almost identical to the vision of empathy advanced by
President Obama, Clarence Thomas said of criminal defendants specifically that as a
judge “you feel that you have the same fate, or could have, as those individuals.”59 Taken
at face value then, it seems clear that Clarence Thomas as a nominee at least purported to
espouse an empathy or empathetic tendencies nearly identical to those advanced by
President Obama.60
Despite the similarities between the Thomas and Obama notions of empathy the
ideological divide that tinges today’s debate over empathy did not seem to exist when
Thomas was nominated. In fact, empathy was seen as an admirable quality in Thomas
and his empathy was praised openly by President George H.W. Bush at the time of his

54

Muller, ibid.

55

See, e.g., id. at 229 (discussing how a justice supposedly “walk[ing] in the shoes” of criminal
defendants could possibly rule against them so frequently).

56

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
260 (1991)(Statement of Clarence Thomas) [hereinafter Thomas Hearing].
57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id. Accord. Obama, supra note 31 at 67 (“We wouldn’t tolerate schools that don’t teach, that are
chronically underfunded and understaffed and underinspired, if we thought the children in them were
somehow like our children. It’s hard to imagine a CEO of a company giving himself a multimillion-dollar
bonus while cutting health-care coverage for his workers if he thought they were in some sense his
equals.”).
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nomination.61 What’s more Thomas was purposefully chosen to take the seat of Thurgood
Marshall,62 a Justice widely and perhaps controversially regarded by many for his views
on empathy as a jurist.63 Albeit with significant reservations by many in the civil rights
community64 Thomas was embraced by the right as an acceptable replacement to
Marshall on the Court.65 When nominating Thomas, President Bush said that Thomas was
“delightful and warm”66 and stated plainly that Thomas was a “person who had great
empathy.”67

In the nomination and Senate confirmation of Clarence Thomas any

empathetic qualities Thomas espoused were laudable and fairly uncontroversial. To be
sure his actual use of empathy on the Court is another matter, the implications of which
are taken up in Part III.
b.

Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Similarly to the nomination and confirmation of Clarence Thomas, empathy as

informed by unique background experiences was not a trait to be shied away from in the
nomination and confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg.68 Indeed, the benefits of empathy

61

See Brian Beutler, Flashback: George H.W. Bush on Clarence Thomas’ Empathy, Talking Points
Memo (May 27, 2009) available at http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/05/flashback-george-hwbush-on-clarence-thomas-great-empathy.php.
62

See “Clarence Thomas,” The Oyez Project, available at
http://www.oyez.org/justices/clarence_thomas.
63

See Rollert, supra note 47.

64

See Evan Thomas, Where Does He Stand?, Newsweek (Jul. 14, 1991) available at
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/1991/07/14/where-does-he-stand.html.

65

See id.

66

Beutler, supra note 60.

67

Id.

68

It is clear from the testimony that Justice Ginsburg’s background is unique and meaningful for a
host of reasons including her Judaism, her upbringing in a first-generation family, and socio-economic
difficulties as a child. See infra note 68 at 186. However, due to space constraints and the significant work
of Ginsburg in the area of women’s rights this paper focuses primarily on Justice Ginsburg’s background as
it pertains to gender and serving as the second woman on the Court. See also Emily Bazelon, The Place of

15

were explicitly invoked when Ginsburg was asked by Senator Metzenbaum whether she
could “understand what it is to have your boss threaten your livelihood and your family’s
economic well-being…[in response to] trying to organize”69 for better working
conditions. Ginsburg’s response was unwavering: “I think that if you take a full and fair
look at the body of decisions I have written…you will be well satisfied that I possess the
empathy you have just expressed.”70
It also seems clear that Ginsburg’s experiences as a leading woman in the law and
what she would bring to the Court as a result of these experiences were seen as net
positives for the Court by many. Senator Moynihan upon introducing and recommending
Ginsburg to the Senate Judiciary Committee highlighted Ginsburg’s role as one of the
early woman law clerks to the Supreme Court, her experience as “one of the first tenured
women professors in the country”71 and as a “moving force behind the women’s rights
project of the American Civil Liberties Union, the prime architect of the fight to
invalidate discriminatory laws against individuals on the basis of gender.”72 Senator
D’Amato similarly praised Ginsburg’s enrollment at Harvard Law School “at a time
when it was not popular for young women to enter law school”73 and cited with apparent
admiration her “difficult time breaking the ‘old boy’ network that excluded so many

Women on the Court, N.Y. Times (Jul. 7, 2009)(discussing the significance of Ginsburg’s womanhood as
impacting her work on the Court) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/magazine/12ginsburgt.html?pagewanted=all.
69

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., at 152-3
(1993)(Senator Metzenbaum) [hereinafter Ginsburg Hearing].
70

Id. (Statement of Ruth Bader Ginsburg).

71

Id. at 10-11 (Statement of Senator Moynihan).

72

Id.

73

Id. at 11-12 (Prepared Statement of Senator D’Amato).
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other fine law graduates.”74 Eleanor Holmes Norton of the District of Columbia praised
Ginsburg for spending her life “making things how they ought to be,”75 and for “us[ing]
the law, always carefully, always defensibly, for all those left at the margins”76 only after
calling her “the chief navigator in the journey that took women…into the safe harbor of
the U.S. Constitution.”77
The Judiciary Committee was made aware at the time of Ginsburg’s confirmation
hearing of the possible affect Ginsburg’s background experiences could have in her role
as a Justice on the Court. “Constitutional interpretation,”78 Senator DeConcini reminded
the group, “requires an exercise of discretionary judgment[] [t]hus, we must carefully
choose the Constitution’s most important interpreters.”79 Such remarks show that the
Judiciary Committee was conscious of the ways in which Ginsburg’s background could
impact her work on the Court, especially where the law is uncertain.

Interestingly

however it does not seem as though empathy specifically arose as a proxy for judicial
activism or for biased decision-making as it would in later nominations and
confirmations, beginning with that of Justice Sonia Sotomayor.
c.

Sonia Sotomayor
The nomination and confirmation of Sonia Sotomayor appears to be the beginning

of real controversy in the debate over empathy in the nomination and confirmation
process. Republicans were quick to call President Obama’s empathy standard “a code
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word for an activist judge.”80 Moreover, it became clear in the Sotomayor hearings that
the empathy debate was more accurately “over the relative clarity of the law…and where
a judge should look whenever the law is unclear.”81 Senator Orrin Hatch’s remarks to the
Federalist Society in 2009 are an apt summary of the opposition to President Obama’s
empathy standard in the context of the Sotomayor nomination: “In [the] activist view of
judicial power, the desired ends defined by a judge’s empathy justify whatever means he
uses to decide cases…[t]his activist view of judicial power is at odds with our written
constitution….”82 While President Obama explicitly advanced his version of empathy as
a key trait in nominees to the Court with the nomination of Sonia Sotomayor,83 detractors
were quick to reveal their underlying fears of the empathy standard as a broad license for
judges in decision-making and discretion.
Given the strong reaction to empathy84 as a quality sought in Supreme Court
nominees and the political implications of an extended debate over empathy85 it was
unsurprisingly a subject that then-nominee Sotomayor attempted to skirt and deny during
her confirmation hearings.86 This is so despite the widespread discussion of empathy in
the opening statements of both Republican and Democratic senators at the hearings.87
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Speaking second at the outset of the hearing Senator Jeff Sessions set the tone for the
opposition to the empathy standard saying “this ‘empathy standard’ is another step down
the road to a liberal activist, results-oriented, and relativistic world where…unelected
judges set policy, [and] Americans are seen as members of separate groups….”88 He
continued on to imply that through an empathy standard fairness and impartiality were
suspect, saying curtly “I will not vote for…an individual…who is not fully committed to
fairness and impartiality toward every person who appears before them.”89 This was a
subject area that clearly posed a philosophical, and in turn political, bramble patch for
Sotomayor.90 When given the opportunity to address the Judiciary Committee Sotomayor
stated that her judicial philosophy was simply “fidelity to the law”91 and that in each case
she has heard she has simply “applied the law to the facts at hand.”92 The task of the
judge, Sotomayor repeated with conviction, “is not to make the law, it is to apply the
law.”93
Much of the remaining discussions of empathy in the Sotomayor hearings
revolved around Sotomayor’s Latina background and alleged bias in favor of Latinos
given her infamous remarks on “wise Latina”94 women. Responding to various charges
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that her comments that “a wise Latina woman…would…reach a better conclusion”95 in
certain decisions show bias on her part and thus the potential dangers of empathy as a
consideration Sotomayor stated that “I do not believe that any ethnic, racial, or gender
group has an advantage in sound judging…I do believe that every person has an equal
opportunity to be a good and wise judge regardless of their background….”96 Despite
successful attempts by many to—in the words of one eminent senator—make a
“mountain out of a molehill”97 of Sotomayor’s remarks and her empathy, Sotomayor
managed to successfully evade in-depth engagement in a Bork-like debate on empathy
and her background. As a result she was successfully confirmed.98
d.

Elena Kagan
In 2010 Elena Kagan was nominated by President Obama to the United States

Supreme Court and was confirmed by the United States Senate in a 63-37 vote.99 No
mention of empathy was made by the Obama administration when appointing Kagan or
upon the retirement of Justice John Paul Stevens.100 Kagan’s controversy over remarks on
the role of confirmation hearings are perhaps most instructive for purposes of
understanding empathy and its elusive role in the Supreme Court confirmation process
and on the Court.
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Having served as both Dean of Harvard Law School and Solicitor General of the
United States Kagan’s professional qualifications were hardly a serious point of
contention.101

Instead the Senate Judiciary Committee, as with nearly all recent

nominees, focused begrudgingly on seeking to uncover just what kind of Justice Kagan
might be if confirmed and with reconciling apparent inconsistencies.102

In written

responses Kagan answered questions from Senator Orrin Hatch regarding her 1995
Chicago Law Review article “Confirmation Messes, Old and New.”103 In the article
Kagan argued that when Senators fail to delve deep into legal issues with Court nominees
the Senate and public lose their ability to meaningfully evaluate the nominee.104
Responding to Senator Hatch’s request for her to reconcile her 1995 position with her
pending nomination Kagan responded with an about face on her prior position: “I
am…less convinced than I was in 1995 that public discussions of substantive legal issues
and views, in the context of nomination hearings, provide the great public benefits I
suggested….”105 Kagan subsequently confessed that her “views on this question have
evolved in some ways, but [she] continue[s] to think the question well worth
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exploring.”106 Given Justice Kagan’s scholarship on the confirmation process and her
subsequent reversal in confirmation testimony, her remarks perhaps most significantly
leave open serious questions as to the proper role of Senate confirmation hearings. But
her responses to these inquires are also revealing when one considers the way in which
considerations of empathy were disowned by nominee-Kagan at the time of her
confirmation.
At Kagan’s hearing Senator John Kyl noted the arguable point that Justice
Sotomayor, in her confirmation hearings, “explicitly rejected the empathy standard”107
that had been advanced by President Obama. Kyl further claimed that in nominating
Kagan the president “repackaged”108 empathy. Kagan however, like Sotomayor, proved
adept at avoiding significant discussions of empathy and rather unarguably rejected
President Obama’s view explicitly. When asked by Senator Kyl whether she agreed that
the law “only takes you the first 25 miles of the marathon and that the last mile has to be
decided by what is in the judge’s heart”109 Kagan stated: “Senator Kyl, I think it’s the law
all the way down…the question is what the law requires.”110 When probed further on the
president’s empathy standard Kagan simply remarked “I don’t know what the President
was speaking about specifically.”111 Kagan’s remarks on the confirmation process and
empathy in her testimony are revealing of the ways in which old ideas can be disowned
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and the fabric of history and intellectual thought re-spun. Obviously opinions, attitudes,
and viewpoints shift and can change over time.

III.

Rethinking Empathy

A good argument exists that despite the seemingly obvious benefits that seem to
result from empathy its impact in specific decisions of the Court is hard to predict,
decipher, or even distinguish. Whether or not a particular Justice will employ empathy in
a particular case—like adherence to any principle promised or conveyed in a
confirmation hearing—is highly uncertain. As such, the strength of empathy as the sole
criterion in appointing Justices to the Supreme Court remains elusive and reasonably
open to question. This is so for a number of reasons but chiefly because of the utter
unpredictability of the decisions of Justices once confirmed to the Court.112
Justice Clarence Thomas serves as an apt example. For all of President Bush’s
talk of his jovial comportment and resounding “empathy,”113 and Thomas’ own talk of his
ability to “walk in the shoes”114 of litigants, Thomas is now uncontroversially viewed as
one of the Court’s most un-empathetic Justices.115 This has notably been seen in his
dissent in Hudson v. McMillian, in which Thomas took the unpopular position that the
abuse of a prisoner by prison guards in that particular case did not rise to the level of
112

Indeed it was Justice Ginsburg who promised at her confirmation hearing only that there would be
“no hints, no forecasts, [and] no previews” to her judicial decision-making. Ginsburg Hearing, supra note
68 at 323. Unpredictability in judicial decision-making also rears its head in other forms, such as stare
decisis. Compare Roberts Hearing, supra note 39 with Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
113

See Beutler, supra note 60.

114

Thomas Hearing, supra note 55.

115

See Muller, supra note 48.

23

being cruel and unusual punishment.116 Despite a 7-2 decision by the Court in favor of
the brutally abused prisoner117 Thomas’ apparent view that the Eighth Amendment
“should not be turned into…a National Code of Prison Regulation”118 seemed to trump
any considerations of empathy for the prisoner.
Justice Ginsburg on the other hand has been said to actively employ her
experiences as a pioneering woman in the law to empathize with litigants,119 and this is
arguably seen in her dissent in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.120 Justice
Sotomayor, despite being touted as President Obama’s model of empathy, has had her
empathy described by at least one Democratic senator as “not all that it was cracked up to
be.”121 In-depth academic work focusing on Justice Sotomayor and her decisions on
immigration and criminal convictions show that “far from allowing empathy to color her
decision-making, she has tended to decide these cases based on neutral principles”122 and
often with “harsh consequences.”123 Justice Kagan, who has spent little time on the
Supreme Court or any bench for that matter has managed to evade much formal
evaluation of her use of empathy, though we do know from her confirmation hearing that
she is, at least publicly, somewhat perplexed as to empathy’s “specific[]”124 application.
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How can we tell with any certainty whether a Justice is employing empathy in a
particular case, regardless of whether or not they rule for or against the litigant with
whom one might reasonably expect them to empathize or be empathetic? The short
answer, revealed in the confirmation testimonies and subsequent tenures of the four
Justices discussed herein is that it is hardly at all possible to tell. Like stare decisis,125
principles of comity, abstention doctrines, or myriad cannons of statutory interpretation,
empathy on the bench appears not only necessary and purposeful on its face, but also
clouded in its actual application by a mystery akin only to doctrines of judicial discretion.
Elena Kagan’s reversals and denials in her confirmation hearing show how opinions and
ideas change over time. Perhaps Justice Kagan will evolve as a champion of empathy
while Justice Sotomayor will prove the opposite.

The only real certainty is that

predictions with purporting any degree of certainty on this matter seem difficult to make.
It comes as no surprise then that in recent nominations and confirmations empathy
as a code word for activist judges has really become a “strawman.”126 The more accurate
debate at its heart pertains to what judges should do in the face of a dearth of legal
clarity127 in “the last mile”128 of a constitutional decision where the law provides no
concrete answers. One side says that decisions at this point are only made “on the basis
of one’s deepest values, one’s core concerns, one’s broader perspectives on how the
world works, and the depth and breadth of one’s empathy.”129 The other side of this
debate seems to settle for calling such a position activist. Interestingly, in offering no
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solution this same side also fails to acknowledge that ambiguity in certain constitutional
decisions exists at all, preferring to think that every constitutional pitch is either clearly
the proverbial ball or strike. Either way, the proper place of empathy in judicial decisionmaking—that is, to contribute where the law fails to serve-up concrete answers—again
portends the potential for uncertainty in its actual application.

Conclusion
It has been said that the debate over judicial empathy is one that is not recent but
has really been going on for centuries.130 The revelation that the debate over empathy is
really a debate over what a Justice should do where the law is silent indeed supports this
point131 and indicates that the debate over empathy, at least beyond its being a political
buzzword, will not cease in the near future though it may shift in form. The Obama
administration’s conception of empathy appears to be clear, reasonable, and workable but
obvious political considerations in the confirmation process seem to have stymied overtly
embracing empathy as a consideration or publicly debating its merits. Despite this
phenomenon it also seems clear from Court opinions, the scholarly literature, and the way
in which the minds of Justices change once on the Court that the role empathy plays for a
particular Justice on the Court is really quite unpredictable in any given case.
All of this suggests that perhaps empathy should not be the leading consideration
advanced by the president in choosing a nominee but rather should play more of a
supporting role along with other considerations. Despite the convincing and I believe
130
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correct arguments—shown in the testimonies of various nominees nominated by various
presidents over two decades—for why empathy is a meaningful and admirable quality
this remains the case. However, that empathy should be considered alongside other
qualities does not mean that these other qualities that should be considered are any less
nebulous and complicated than the empathy standard itself.

This paper will leave

exploration of these qualities for further academic work in this area. It will leave to the
president and senate the unenviable task of attempting to find out exactly “what is in
the…heart”132 of a given nominee on any given day.
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